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CHAPTER 8 
Domestic Relations 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 8.1. Survival Of Actions For Accrued Alimony.* When a spouse fails to 
make the alimony payments required by a divorce judgment, I the obligee 
spouse may sue in probate court for the unpaid amount. 2 A suit for 
accrued alimony may be brought against the obligor spouse3 or, in the 
event of the obligor spouse's death, his4 estate.s In Spiliotis v. Campbell, 6 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed two questions regarding the 
survival of such actions. First, the court considered whether the defense 
of laches can bar an action for support arrears. 7 Second, the issue of 
whether such an action survives the death of the obligee spouse was 
addressed. 8 The Spiliotis court virtually eliminated the defense of laches 
in arrearages actions and held that the death of the obligee spouse does 
not abate the claim for arreats. 
Concetta Spiliotis was the former wife of Phillip Spiliotis.9 The couple 
t Linda A. Ouellette, Tamara Wolfson, Richard I. McCready. 
* Linda A. Ouellette, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 8.1. I The probate courts have the power to award judgments to pay alimony upon 
divorce or upon motion after divorce pursuant to G.L. c. 208, § 34. 
2 G.L. c. 208, § 34 gives authority to the probate courts to enforce alimony decrees in the 
same manner as they enforce judgments in equity. It has long been recognized that equity 
courts may award accrued alimony under state divorce decrees. See Barber v. Barber, 62 
U.S. (21 How.) 582, 591 (1858). 
3 See, e.g., Bullock v. Zeiders, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1870,428 N.E.2d 311. 
4 The use of the term "his" is not meant to imply that only a husband may be ordered to 
pay alimony to his wife, and that a wife may never be ordered to pay alimony to her 
husband. Prior to 1974, G.L. c. 208, § 34 allowed a probate court to decree "alimony" to a 
wife and part ofa wife's estate "in the nature of alimony " to a husband. [d. Historically, as a 
result, most nonpayment cases were brought by wives. See I. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 2A 
MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 2073, at 660-61 (1967). G.L. c. 208, § 34, as amended in 1974, 
allows a probate court to order either party to pay alimony to the other. [d. Thus, the use of 
the term "his estate" encompasses the estates of both wives and husbands under a duty to 
pay alimony. 
5 See, e.g.,-Knapp v. Knapp, 134 Mass. 353,357 (1883). 
6 13 Mass. App. Ct. 189, 431 N.E.2d. 591 (1982). 
7 [d. at 190, 431 N.E.2d at 592. 
8 [d. at 190-93, 431 N.E.2d at 592-94. 
9 [d. at 189, 431 N .E.2d at 592. 
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was divorced on January 26, 1967, and the divorce decree mandated that 
Phillip pay support to Concetta and their son Nicholas. 10 Concetta died on 
AprilS, 1970, and Phillip died on August 27,1979, without having paid any 
of the support ordered in the divorce decree. I I On April 4, 1980, the 
administratrix of Concetta Spiliotis' estate and Nicholas Spiliotis brought 
suit in probate court against the estate of Phillip Spiliotis to recover 
arrears in support.12 The executrix of Phillip Spiliotis' estate filed a 
motion to dismiss.13 The probate judge ruled that the complaint did state 
claims against Phillip Spiliotis' estate, but dismissed the action on the 
ground of laches. 14 
The Appeals Court reversed the probate court's decision. ls The court 
stated that the complaint should not have been dismissed based on a 
defense of laches. 16 The court noted that a defense of laches requires not 
only a showing of delay, but also of prejudice to the defendant resulting 
from the delay,17 Because the requisite prejudice was not apparent from 
the face of the complaint,18 the court held that the probate court's dis-
missal of the action was erroneous. 19 
After concluding that the defense oflaches was improperly sustained in 
the case before it, the Appeals Court discussed the propriety of a laches 
defense in any claim for support arrearages.20 The court commented that 
in cases such as the one at bar where there has been a delay in suing for 
arrearages, "the authorities do not treat the matter as one of laches. "21 
10 [d. Specifically, the decree ordered that Phillip pay alimony, child support, school 
tuition and books. 
11 [d. 
12 [d. The suit was brought against Veann C. Campbell, the executrix of Phillip Spiliotis' 
estate. [d. 
13 [d. Defendant's motion to dismiss was based on Mass. R. Dom. ReI. P. 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. [d. While not stating so directly, 
the opinion suggests that the defendant's motion to dismiss was based not only on a theory 
that Concetta Spiliotis' death barred an action to collect arrears, but also on a defense of 
laches. An affirmative defense may be raised in a motion to dismiss so long as the ~efects 
upon which the defenses are based appear on the face of the complaint. l.R. NOLAN, CIVIL 
PRACTICE, 9 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 297, at 307 (1975). 
14 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 190,431 N.E.2d at 592. Laches is the equitable doctrine by which 
a party may be estopped from bringing a claim because he has failed to do so at the proper 
time. 
IS [d. at 193, 431 N.E.2d at 594. 
16 [d. at 190, 431 N.E.2d at 592. 
17 [d. 
18 Where an affirmative defense such as lacht.s is raised by a motion to dismiss, the 
elements necessary to maintain such a defense must be apparent on the face of the com-
plaint. See supra note 13. 
19 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 190,431 N.E.2d at 592. 
20 [d. 
21 [d. 
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Rather, the court noted, where a laches defense is asserted in such a case, 
the court should inquire only whether a modification of the support decree 
is proper in light of the delay.22 The Appeals Court cited to its 1981 
decision in Bullock v. Zeiders23 as authority for this proposition. 24 In 
Bullock, the plaintiff filed a complaint for contempt of a support decree. 25 
The defendant raised a defense of laches and counterclaimed for a mod-
ification of the support decree. 26 In considering the defense of laches, the 
Bullock court stated that the requisite prejudice could be proven by a 
change in the financial conditions of the obligor-defendant during the 
delay peri9dY The court noted, however, t~at such a change in financial 
condition would also present a question of whether a modification of the 
support decree was proper. 28 The Bullock court therefore treated the 
question of delay in the context of whether a modification of accrued and 
future support was proper. 29 Moreover, the court suggested that virtually 
every case of support in which a laches defense is advanced presents the 
question of whether modification of the support decree is proper. 30 As a 
result, the Bullock court indicated that the laches defense should be 
subsumed within the issue of whether a modification is necessary.H It is 
this dicta that the Spiliotis court relied upon for its suggestion that in cases 
in which a probate court may modify the support judgment before it,32 a 
laches defense should be treated as modification issue. 33 
The Spiliotis court next considered the issue of the administratrix's 
claim for accrued alimony. 34 In particular, the Appeals Court addressed 
whether the administratrix of Concetta Spiliotis' estate was barred as a 
matter of law from recovering the accrued alimony owed to her dece-
dent. 35 The court noted that dicta in earlier cases suggested that the death 
22 Jd. 
23 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1870, 428 N .E.2d 311. 
24 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 190, 431 N.E.2d at 592. 
25 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1870, 1871,428 N.E.2d 311, 312. 
26 [d. 
27 Jd. at 1873,428 N.E.2d at 313. 
28 [d. at 1873,428 N.E.2d at 313-14. 
29 [d. at 1873,428 N.E.2d at 314. The court found no change in the circumstances of the 
defendant sufficient to justify a modification of the support owed. [d. 
30 [d. 
31 "It is difficult to imagine facts in a case dealing with alimony and support payments 
where the consequences of a delayed claim would not ultimately be subsumed in whether the 
cjrcumstances of the parties had so changed as to require a modification of the earlier 
judgment." [d. 
32 Probate courts have the power to modify support decrees pursuant to O.L. c. 208, § 37. 
See infra note 57 for relevant text. 
33 See 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 190,431 N.E.2d at 314 (citing Bullock v. Zeiders, 1981 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1870, 1873,428 N.E.2d 310, 314). 
34 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 190, 431 N.E.2d at 592. 
35 [d. at 190-91, 431 N.E.2d at 592-93. 
3
Ouellette et al.: Chapter 8: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1982
294 1982 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 8.1 
of an obligee spouse bars an action for arrearages, but that no case had 
clearly decided the issue.36 In considering whether to uphold the dicta, 
the Spiliotis court inquired into the nature of alimony at the time these 
earlier cases were decided. 37 Specifically, the court focused on the case of 
Holbrook v. Comstock. 38 In Holbrook, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld 
the power of an administrator to sue for arrears due under a separation 
agreement.39 Crucial to the Holbrook Court's decision was the fact that 
the money involved was not technically alimony.40 The Holbrook Court 
noted that alimony was not historically treated as the property of the 
wife. 41 Rather, it was treated as the husband's property, given to the wife 
solely for her support.42 Because such payments were not the wife's 
property, they were not recoverable after her death. 43 The Holbrook 
Court, however, distinguished the payments in the case before it from 
alimony on the basis that under the terms of the separation agreement, the 
wife was free to dispose of the money as she pleased.44 The Holbrook 
Court likened the payments involved to annuity payments, a claim to 
which could be passed on to the wife's beneficiary upon her death.45 
After discussing Holbrook, the Appeals Court determined that this 
dicta should not be followed. The Spiliotis court commented that the 
nature of alimony had changed since the time of the Holbrook decision.46 
In particular, the court noted that generally, the legal rights of a wife 
regarding the rights of succession of property had undergone a change.47 
The court also noted that the technical attributes of alimony at the time of 
Holbrook no longer existed, explaining that modern statutory alimony is 
different from common law alimony. 48 The court reasoned that alimony is 
36 Id. at 191,431 N.E.2d at 593. 
37 Id. 
38 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 109 (1860). 
39 Id. at 111. 
40 Id. at 110. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 110-11 
45 Id. at 110. 
46 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 192,431 N.E.2d at 593. 
47 Id. The court cited Dumont v. Godbey, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 51, 415 N.E.2d 188, as 
support for this propostion. In Dumont, the Supreme Judicial Court surveyed the state of the 
law relative to a spouse's property rights in the estate of his or her deceased spouse, both as 
to alimony payments and as to succession to real and personal property. Id. at 52-53, 415 
N .E.2d at 189-90. The Court conducted this survey in the context of a petition for division of 
property after the death ofa spouse underG.L. c. 208, § 34. Id. at 51, 415 N.E.2d at 189. The 
Court also noted the broader rights to property and accompanying freedom to dispose of this 
property given wives under modem law. Id. at 54-55, 415 N.E.2d at 190-91. 
48 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 192, 431 N.E.2d at 593. ' 
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presently more like the annuity payments considered in the Holbrook 
decision, and may, therefore, be recovered after the death of the obligee 
spouse by her estate.49 
The Spiliotis court stated that policy considerations also supported 
allowing alimony recovery after the obligee spouse's death. 50 The court 
commented that to allow claims for accrued support to expire upon the 
death of the obligee spouse would give a financial incentive to obligor 
spouses to disobey support decrees. 51 The value of support decrees to 
obligee spouses would be lessened as well by depriving that spouse of a 
source of credit to obtain support. 52 Finally, the court noted that other 
jurisdictions have upheld the right of the estate of an obligee spouse to sue 
for arrears in support owed the decedent. 53 The Spiliotis court, therefore, 
agreed with the probate judge's determination that the complaint stated a 
valid claim against the estate of Phillip Spiliotis.54 
The Spiliotis decision is significant for two reasons. First, in adopting 
the dicta in Bullock v. Zeiders 55 as authority for merging a laches defense 
into a modification determination, the Spiliotis court effectively elimi-
nated the laches defense in support arrearages cases. The Spiliotis court's 
decision implies that in every future case where a probate court may 
modify a support decree, the Bullock merger will apply.56 Because pro-
bate courts have the power to modify support decrees upon petition by 
parties to such decrees,57 the Bullock merger is applicable in all actions in 
which a modification petition is brought. The power to modify support 
decrees is not, however, limited to cases in which a petition for modifica-
tion is brought. Rather, a probate court may always modify a support 
decree retrospectively or prospectively in any case before it, regardless of 
whether a petition for modification is brought by one of the parties.58 The 
Spiliotis court, therefore, has extended the Bullock language to all arrears 
actions. Through the expansion of the Bullock merger, the Spiliotis deci-
491d. 
SOld. 
slId. 
52 Id. 
S3 Id. (citing Heaton v. Davis, 216 Ala. 197, 198-99, 112 So. 756, 757 (1927); Dinet v. 
Eigenmann, 80 Ill. 274,279 (1875); Miller v. Clark, 23 Ind. 370,376-77 (1864». 
S4 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 192-93, 431 N.E.2d at 594. 
ss 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1870, 428 N.E.2d 311. 
S6 See 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 190, 431 N.E.2d at 592. 
S7 "After a judgment for alimony or an annual allowance for the spouse or children, the 
court may, from time to time, upon the action for modification of either party, revise and 
alter its judgment relative to the amount of such alimony or annual allowance and the 
payment thereof .... " G.L. c. 208, § 37. 
58 Binder v. Binder, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 761, 390 N.E.2d 260, 266 (1979). The Binder 
court's interpretation of the probate court~' power to modify support decrees appears to 
represent an expansive reading of the power granted under G.L. c. 208, § 37. See supra note 
57. 
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sion suggests that a laches defense can never bar a claim for arrearages. 59 
Instead, the delay and prejudice requisite to a defense of laches will be 
relevant only insofar as they work a change in the circumstances of the 
parties substantial enough to justify a modification of the amount of 
arrears owed. 60 
Second, in upholding the right of the administratrix to sue for arrears, 
Spiliotis continues a trend in Massachusetts decisional law recognizing 
the survival of such actions. 61 For example, while the cessation of the 
continuing obligation to pay alimony under a divorce decree62 and the 
lapse of the right to initially petition for alimony63 upon the death of the 
obligor spouse have been recognized, the right to collect arrears from the 
estate of the obligor spouse has long been established. 64 Similarly, the 
power of a probate court to specifically order that alimony continue to be 
paid out of an obligor's estate after his death as well as while he is alive 
has been upheld. 65 Spiliotis continues this trend by recognizing the right 
of the estate of an obligee spouse to sue for arrears after the death of the 
obligee. 66 
The trend in recognizing the survival of arrearage actions evidences a 
fairly recent change in perspectives toward alimony under Massachusetts 
l.aw. 67 The Spiliotis decision is, therefore, important in that it continues 
the abandonment of outdated notions of alimony and property disposition 
upon divorce. Alimony was originally derived from English ecclesiastical 
laW. 68 Under ecclesiastical law, divorce was limited to an authorization of 
the separation of the parties, without a dissolution of the marriage. 69 
Alimony was awarded in recognition of a husband's duty at common law 
59 Earlier cases involving arrears in support had dismissed a laches defense and instead 
considered a modification of the amount of support due. See, e.g., McIlroy v. McIlroy, 208 
Mass. 458, 462, 94 N.E. 696, 697-98, 699 (1911). These cases did not, however, rule out 
the possibility of a laches defense in future cases. ld. 
60 Cf. J. LOMBARD, supra note 4, at § 2085, at 694 (suggesting arrears proceedings may be 
barred by laches in some cases). 
61 See infra notes 62-64. 
62 See Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178, 182, 106 N.E. 595, 596 (1914); Knapp v. Knapp, 134 
Mass. 353, 355 (1883). 
63 See Gediman v. Cameron, 306 Mass. 138, 141, 27 N.E.2d 696, 698 (1940). 
64 See Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178,182,106 N.E. 595, 596 (1914); Knapp v. Knapp, 134 
Mass. 353, 355 (1883). 
6S See Surabian v. Surabian, 362 Mass. 342, 348, 285 N.E.2d 909,913 (1972). In addition, 
where such a decree exists, it has been held that an action for a division of property under 
G.L. c. 208, § 34 does not abate on the death ofthe former spouse. Dumont v. Godbey, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 51,57,415 N.E.2d 188, 192. 
66 13 Mass. App. ct. at 194, 431 N.E.2d at 594. 
67 See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
68 H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.1, at 420 (1968). 
69/d. 
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to support his wife so long as the marriage relation continued. 70 Under the 
traditional characterization of alimony as a continuation of the husband's 
obligation to support, arrears for alimony presumably could not survive 
the death of the wife because her need for support ceased upon her 
death.71 Modem divorce, however, dissolves the marriage bond.72 The 
view of alimony as a continuation of a duty to support is, therefore, of 
questionable validity. 73 In light of this change in the nature of divorce, 
some courts have viewed alimony not as a continuation of support, but 
rather as an equitable property settlement between the parties upon 
dissolution of the marriage.74 It is this view of alimony that the Spiliotis 
court appears to have adopted in its decision to uphold the right to sue for 
arrears after the death of the obligee. Characterized as an equitable 
property settlement, alimony becomes the property of the wife. As a 
result, any claims to alimony arrears should survive the death of the 
obligee spouse as do other claims of a decedent. 
In summary, the Massachusetts Appeals Courts in Spiliotis v. Campbell 
clarified two aspects of the survival of arrearages actions. In finding that 
claims for arrears survive the death of the obligee, the court continued the 
general trend recognizing the survival of alimony actions. Moreover, the 
court's decision to reject outdated dicta is consistent with the modem 
view of alimony as property settlement, and not merely as support. 
Additionally, in its treatment of the laches issue, the court maintained the 
special nature of alimony decrees. By treating the defense of laches -
which would, if upheld, bar the action - as a modification question, the 
court continued to recognize alimony decrees as continuing and not final 
decrees which, by nature, remain forever modifiable by the parties. 
§ 8.2. Right to Forego Medical Treatment - Jurisdiction of Juvenile 
Court - Minor in Custody of Department of Social Services. * A terminally 
ill patient's right to forego or terminate medical treatment is a recently 
emerging concept. i In the 1977 landmark case of Superintendent of Bel-
7Q [d. The notion of limiting a wife's "ownership" of her husband's property was reflected 
as well in the law governing her succession to property after his death. At common law, a 
widow was entitled to a life estate in one-third of her husband's estate, sufficient to assure 
her a means of support after the death of her husband. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION 
TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 11, at 55-56 (1962). 
71 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
72 G.L. c. 208, § I. 
73 See H. CLARK, supra note 68, at § 14.1, at 421. 
74 See, e.g., Miller v. Clark, 23 Ind. 370, 376 (1864). 
* Tamara Wolfson, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 8.2. 1 The right of a terminally ill patient to forego medical treatment was first 
recognized in the landmark case of In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. 
denied sub. nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See a/so, Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Satz v. 
Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.2d 266 (1981). 
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chertown State School v. Saikewicz,2 the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts recognized the constitutional right of both competent and 
incompetent persons to forego life-prolonging medical treatment absent 
countervailing state interests. 3 The Saikewicz Court held that a guardian 
may exercise this right on behalf of his incompetent ward by petitioning 
for a court order to withhold or terminate the treatment in question. 4 In 
ruling on such a petition, the probate court is to "don the mental mantle of 
the incompetent,"S and make a substituted judgment representing the 
decision the incompetent patient would make if competent. 6 In Saikewicz, 
the Court emphasized that this determination should rest in the hands of 
the jUdiciary. 7 In so doing, the Court rejected the approach taken by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in the landmark case of In re Quinlan. 8 The 
Quinlan Court left the substituted judgment decision to the incompetent's 
family, guardian, physician, and hospital's ethics committee.9 
The Supreme Judicial Court clarified the role of the judiciary in such 
2 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
3 Id. at 745,370 N.E.2d at 427. The Supreme Judicial Court based its holding in Saikewicz 
on the constitutional right of privacy derived from the penumbras of specific guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479,484 (1965). 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N .E.2d at 424. The Supreme Judicial Court analogized 
to the holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which recognized the right offemales to 
procure abortions, and found that the constitutional right to privacy also encompasses the 
right of patients to reject treatment that infringes on bodily integrity. 373 Mass. at 739, 370 
N.E.2d at 424. The Court further held that the "principles of equality and respect for all 
individuals," id. at 745, 370 N .E.2d at 427, require that the right to choose to forego medical 
treatment be extended to the incompetent as well as the competent individual, "because the 
value of human dignity extends to both." Id. Although it recognized the parens patriae 
power of a state to care for the best interests of an incompetent, id., the Court stated that the 
best interests of an incompetent cannot be served by subjecting him to medical treatment 
that a similarly situated competent individual could refuse. Id. at 746-47,370 N .E.2d at 428. 
4 See 373 Mass. 728, 755-57, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433-34 (1977). 
sId. at 752,370 N.E.2d at 431 (quoting In re Carson, 39 Misc.2d 544,545,241 N.Y.S.2d 
288, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962». 
6 Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431. 
7 /d. at 758-59, 370 N.E.2d at 434. 
8 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
9 Id. at 55,355 A.2d at 671-72. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "a practice of 
applying to a court to confirm such decisions [to forego medical treatment] would generally 
be inappropriate, not only because that would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the 
medical profession' s field of competence, but because it would be impossibly cumbersome .. , 
Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. In contrast, the Saikewicz Court stated that placing ultimate 
responsibility for determining when it is appropriate to forego medical treatment would not 
serve as a " 'gratuitous encroachment' on the domain of medical expertise." 373 Mass. 728, 
759,370 N.E.2d 417, 435. Rather, the Court concluded that "such questions of life and death 
seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that 
forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created." Id. For a 
comparison of Quinlan and Saikewicz, see Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: 
Decision Making for the Terminally III Incompetent, 4 AM. J. LAW &: MED. 367 (1979). 
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decisions to forego medical treatment in the subsequent case of In re 
Spring. 10 The Spring Court stated that judicial intervention was not re-
quired in every instance in which the termination of life-prolonging medi-
cal procedures is sought, 1 1 thereby affirming the result previously reached 
by the Appeals Court in In re Dinnerstein. 12 Dinnerstein had focused on 
language in Saikewicz which acknowledged the medical profession's dis-
tinction between curing the ill and prolonging the act of dying. 1 3 When the 
proposed medical treatment can only prolong the act of dying, rather than 
effectuate a temporary or permanent cure of the patient's underlying 
terminal condition, Dinnerstein allowed the decision to forego treatment 
to be made by the patient's family, physician and hospital. 14 The Spring 
Court agreed with the ruling of the Appeals Court in Dinnerstein, noting 
that a court order may not be necessary where the patient has no hope of 
recovery.t5 The Court concluded, however, that once a petition has been 
filed with the probate court for an order to terminate treatment, it is the 
court which must make such a determination and the court cannot dele-
10 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209,405 N.E.2d 115. In Spring, the Court reviewed an order of 
the probate court authorizing Earle Spring's physician and family to decide whether kidney 
dialysis treatment should be continued for an incompetent adult suffering from permanent 
senility and an advanced and incurable kidney disease.ld. at 1210,405 N.E.2d at 117. The 
Probate Court had determined under the substituted judgment test that if Spring were 
competent, he would choose to discontinue the dialysis treatments, and upon remand, 
entered an order allowing Spring's son to withhold authorization for any such further 
treatment.ld. at 1210,405 N .E.2d at 117. This order was subsequently stayed on motion of 
the guardian ad litem for Spring and the court entered a revised order permitting Spring's 
physician, son, and wife to make the ultimate determination. ld. at 1211, 405 N.E.2d at 
117-18. The Court stated that in determining whether a court order should be obtained before 
withholding treatment, a variety of factors should be considered, including: 
the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties, whether the patient is in the 
custody of a State institution, the prognosis without the proposed treatment, the 
prognosis with the proposed treatment, the complexity, risk and novelty of the 
proposed treatment, its possible side effects, the patient's level of understanding and 
probable reaction, the urgency of decision, the consent of the patient, spouse, or 
guardian, the good faith of those who participate in the decision, the clarity of 
professional opinion as to what is good medical practice, the interests of third 
persons, and the administrative requirements of any institution involved. 
ld. at 1216-17,405 N.E.2d at 121. For a discussion of Spring, see Perlin, Constitutional Law, 
1980 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 2.4, at 62-68. 
II See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1216-17,405 N.E.2d at 120-21. 
12 ld. at 1215,405 N .E.2d at 120. In In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 380 N .E.2d 134 
(1978), the Appeals Court held that family and physicians of an Incurably ill elderly woman 
in a vegetative state could agree to enter a no-resuscitation order on the patient's chart 
without prior judicial approval. ld. at 467, 475-76, 380 N.E.2d at 134-35, 139. 
13 ld. at 471-73, 380 N.E.2d at 137-38. 
14 ld. at 475, 380 N.E.2d at 139. 
15 See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1216-17,405 N.E.2d at 120-21. 
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gate that decision to the incompetent's family, doctor or hospital. 16 Con-
sequently, the Spring Court, despite its recognition that in some situations 
the decision to forego medical treatment may be made without a court 
order, did not significantly depart from its earlier position in Saikewicz 
that the judiciary is generally the proper forum for resolving questions 
relating to the right to forego medical treatment. 17 
The petitions for orders to terminate or withhold life-prolonging treat-
ment which were at issue in Saikewicz, Dinnerstein, and Spring were all 
initiated in probate court.IS During the Survey year, in Custody of a 
Minor, 19 the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the role of the judiciary in 
determining when life-sustaining medical treatment may be withheld from 
an incompetent in the context of a petition arising in the Juvenile Court 
Department, rather than in probate court.20 In Custody of a Minor the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to 
approve a "no code" order under which medical personnel would not 
resort to extraordinary means to prolong the life of an infant in the 
custody of the Department of Social Services ("DSS").21 
The infant in Custody of a Minor was suffering from cyanotic heart 
disease, a terminal condition for which there was no known cure or the 
potential of developing a cure,22 and his life expectancy was no more than 
one year. 23 The infant, abandoned at birth by its mother, was a patient at 
the New England Medical Center ("NEMC").24 A social worker at 
NEMC petitioned the Boston Juvenile Court alleging that the child was in 
need of care and protection pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws 
chapter 119, sections 24 and 26.25 The juvenile court appointed a guardian 
ad litem and counsel for the child and separate counsel for the mother.26 
Following a full evidentiary hearing, the court found the infant to be in 
need of care and protection and awarded temporary legal custody to the 
DSS,27 In addition, the judge further provided that any party to the action 
16 [d. at 1219, 405 N.E.2d at 122. 
17 /d. at 1219, 405 N.E.2d at 122; see Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977). 
18 See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,729, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 419 (1977); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 466, 380 N.E.2d 134, 134 
(1978); In re Spring, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 1210, 405 N.E.2d 117, 117. 
19 385 Mass. 697,434 N.E.2d 601 (1982). 
20 [d. at 700, 434 N .E.2d at 603. 
21 [d. 
22 [d. at 701-02, 434 N.E.2d at 604. 
23 [d. at 702, 434 N.E.2d at 604. 
24 [d. at 698, 434 N.E.2d at 602. 
2S [d. For the text of O.L. c. 119, § 24, see infra note 53. O.L. c. 119, § 26 is quoted infra 
at note 49. 
26 [d. 
27 [d. 
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could come before him for further hearing on the matter. 28 
The infant's condition worsened and one month after the Juvenile 
Court's decision, his physicians at NEMC requested the DSS and the 
child's guardian ad litem to consent to entering a "no code" order on the 
child's medical records providing that in the event of cardiac or respira-
tory arrest, no extraordinary medical efforts would be used to resuscitate 
him.29 When both these parties declined to consent,30 the NEMC 
petitioned the Boston Juvenile Court for an order permitting the physi-
cians to enter the' 'no code" order. 31 The petition was granted following a 
hearing on the matter.32 The court provided, however, that NEMC con-
tinue all other medical treatment for the infant and report to the court any 
changes in the infant's condition which could potentially lead to a revision 
in the court's order. 33 Finally, the court stated that it would hear addi-
tional evidence on the matter at the request of any party. 34 On the same 
day, the child's counsel and guardian ad litem obtained a stay of this order 
from a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. 35 
While an appeal of the juvenile court's ruling permitting the entrance of 
the "no code" order was pending in the Appeals Court, the NEMC 
reported a change in the child's condition to the juvenile court and 
requested that court to revoke its previous order. 36 As a result of this 
request, all parties were in agreement that the "no code" order should be 
revoked. A hearing was held and the judge continued in effect the prior 
"no code" order.J7 Additionally, the judge granted a request to authorize 
the release of the infant from the NEMC.38 
Before the juvenile court issued this second order denying the petition 
to revoke the "no code" order, the Supreme Judicial Court, on its own 
motion, granted direct review of the juvenile court's first order authoriz-
ing entry of the "no code" order.39 After the Court granted review, the 
child's guardian ad litem and counsel also sought review of the second 
order of the juvenile court, and the DSS appealed both orders of the 
juvenile court.40 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
30 [d. at 698-99, 434 N.E.2d at 602. 
31 [d. at 699, 434 N.E.2d at 602. 
32 [d. at 699, 434 N.E.2d at 603. 
33 [d. 
34 [d. 
35 [d. 
36 /d. 
37 [d. at 699-700, 434 N.E.2d at 603. 
38 [d. 
39 [d. at 700, 434 N.E.2d at 603. 
40 [d. 
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Three issues were presented to the Supreme Judicial Court: whether 
the Boston Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to enter a "no code" order; 
whether the NEMC had standing to seek a "no code" order; and whether 
the judged erred in the application of the "substituted judgment-best 
interests" test with respect to the decision to enter the "no code" order.41 
In addition to these questions, the parties contended that because they 
were all in agreement that the "no code" order should be revoked, the 
issue was removed from the proper scope of judicial intervention.42 Con-
sequently, the Court was called on for the first time to apply the factors it 
had enunciated in Spring for determining when a judicial order is neces-
sary in order to withhold medical treatment. 43 
The Court began by addressing the issue of whether the juvenile court 
had jurisdiction to enter the "no code" order.44 The Court noted that 
although Saikewicz stated that "[t]he Probate Court ... has been given 
the specific grant of equitable powers to act in all matters relating to 
guardianship,"45 the instant case was not a guardianship proceeding.46 
Instead, the case concerned the proper treatment of a child found to be in 
need of care and protection.47 The Court found that under the Massachu-
setts Care and Protection statute,48 the juvenile courts are responsible for 
carrying out the statute's broad policy of providing for the welfare of 
abandoned children, including determining the proper physicial and medi-
cal procedures for an infant within its jurisdiction.49 This statutory grant 
of jurisdiction, the Court continued, necessarily encompasses the author-
41 ld. 
42 ld. at 707, 434 N.E.2d at 607. 
43 ld. at 708-09, 434 N.E.2d at 607-09. See, In re Spring, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1210, 
1216-17,405 N.E.2d 117, 120-21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
44 385 Mass. at 704-05, 434 N.E.2d 605-06. 
4S ld. at 705, 435 N.E.2d at 606 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 755, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431). 
46 385 Mass. at 705, 434 N.E.2d at 606. 
47 ld. 
48 G.L. c. 119, § 26(3). 
49 See 385 Mass. at 704, 434 N.E.2d at 605 (quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. 
Municipal Court of the Dorchester District, 374 Mass. 640, 666-67, 374 N.E.2d 272, 287 
(1978». G.L. c. 119, § 26 provides in part: 
If the court finds the allegations in the petition proved within the meaning of this 
chapter, it may adjudge that said child is in need of care and protection and may 
commit the child to the custody ofthe department until he becomes eighteen years of 
age or until in the opinion of the department the object of his commitment has been 
accomplished, whichever occurs first; or make any other appropriate order with refer-
ence to the care and custody of the child as may conduce to his best interest, 
including but not limited to anyone or more of the following: 
(3) It may order appropriate physical care including medical or dental care. 
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ity to determine that certain medical procedures are not appropriate for an 
infant. so Accordingly, the Court found that the action was properly before 
the juvenile court.SI 
The Court next turned to the issue of whether the NEMC had standing 
to petition the juvenile court to enter the "no code" order. 52 Based in part 
on the language of the Care and Protection statute which provides that 
"any person" may, on petition, initiate a care and protection proceeding, 
the Court held that NEMC had standing to seek the "no code" order.S3 
The Court recognized that its previous decisions had held that the words 
"any person" included a hospita}.S4 The Court noted that this interpreta-
tion of the statutory language was necessary in order to insure the fur-
therance of the statutory objective of providing for the welfare of minors 
because hospital personnel are often the only persons beyond a child's 
immediate family members who can detect the need for a care and 
protection order.55 Moreover, the Court observed, in the case before it, 
the NEMC, as a party to the ongoing care and protection proceedings, 
was the only party in a position to seek a "no code" order from the 
juvenile court due to the DSS policy of refusing to consider any such 
requests for minors within its custody. 56 
After deciding that the NEMC had standing to petition for a "no code" 
order and that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to enter such an order, 
the Court addressed the parties' contention that the matter was removed 
from the scope of judicial decision-making when all the parties agreed that 
the "no code" order should be discontinued.57 The Court acknowledged 
that in Spring it had recognized that in some situations the decision of 
whether to forego life-prolonging medical treatment may be made by 
private parties without the necessity of a court order. 58 The Court ob-
50 385 Mass. at 705, 434 N.E.2d at 606. 
51 /d. 
52 Id. at 705-07, 434 N.E.2d at 606-07. 
53 Id. at 707, 434 N.E.2d at 607. G.L. c. 119, § 24 provides: 
The Boston juvenile court, ... upon the petition of any person alleging on behalf of a 
child ... that said child is without: (a) necessary and proper physical or educational 
care and discipline, or; (b) is growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging 
to the child's sound character development, or; (c) who lacks proper attention of 
parent, guardian with care and custody, or custodian, or whose parents or guardian 
are unwilling, incompetent or unavailable to provide any such care, ... may ... issue 
... [an] appropriate order. 
54 385 Mass. at 706, 434 N.E.2d at 606 (citing Custody ofa Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 743, 379 
N.E.2d 1053, 1060 (1978». 
55 Id. at 706-07, 434 N.E.2d at 606-07. 
56Id. 
57 Id. at 707, 434 N.E.2d at 607. 
58 Id. at 708, 434 N.E.2d at 607. See supra note 10. 
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served, however, that several of the factors listed in Spring as indicative 
of the need for judicial decision making were present in the case before 
it. S9 First, the Court noted that the infant was a ward of the state and 
lacked competence to make the decision, the parents were not present to 
make a decision for their child, the child was suffering from an incurable 
disease with no hope of successful treatment, medical opinion on the 
child's diagnosis and prognosis was unanimous, and the medical treat-
ment in question would be painful and intrusive.60 Second, the Court 
stressed that the infant was already within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court when the issue of the propriety of the "no code" order arose.61 In 
such a situation, the Court stated, under its holding in Spring, a court 
properly presented with the legal question of whether treatment may be 
withheld must decide that issue and cannot delegate its resolution to some 
private person or group.62 According to the Court, a subsequent agree-
ment among the parties cannot serve to defeat the court's jurisdiction or 
require it to rule in accordance with the parties' agreement.63 
After making this determination, the Court noted that the matter before 
it also shared certain features which were present in Dinnerstein. 64 Spe-
cifically, the Court recognized the fact that in both cases a "no code" 
order was in issue and the patient was terminally ill.6s Unlike Dinnerstein, 
however, the Court stated that the infant had no "loving family" with 
whom the physicians could confer regarding the decision to forego efforts 
at resuscitation.66 The Court considered this distinction to be crucial, 
holding that the decision regarding the entrance ofthe "no code" order in 
the case before it should be made by the judiciary applying the substituted 
judgment standard articulated in Saikewicz. 67 
Finally, the Court reviewed the propriety of the juvenile court's deci-
sion allowing the "no code" order to remain in effect.68 The Court stated 
that the juvenile court had based its decision on its finding that any 
extraordinary efforts at resuscitation would involve a significant degree of 
bodily invasion and pain, and that such efforts would not cure the child's 
underlying disease, but instead would merely prolong the infant's pain 
and suffering. 69 According to the Court, the juvenile court concluded that 
59 Id. at 709, 434 N.E.2d at 60S. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
60 Id. at 709, 434 N.E.2d at 60S. 
61Id. 
62 Id.; see In re Spring, 19S0 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1210,1219,405 N.E.2d 117, 122. 
63 3S5 Mass. at 709, 434 N.E.2d at 60S. 
64Id. at 709-10, 434 N.E.2d at 60S. 
65 /d. 
66 Id. at 710, 434 N.E.2d at 60S. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 711-14, 434 N.E.2d at 609-10. 
69 Id. at 711, 434 N.E.2d at 609. 
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if the infant "had the mental capacity to understand the incurable nature 
of his illness, the terminal prognosis, the nature and purpose of a 'full 
code' order and the virtual certainty of its limited and temporary effect, he 
would choose to forego its use. "70 At the hearing on the revocation of the 
prior "no code" order and the discharge of the infant from the hospital, 
the lower court had found that a discharge would be the functional 
equivalent of a "no code" order because the child would most likely not 
be able to arrive at a hospital in time for resuscitation if the need for such 
treatment arose. 71 The Supreme Judicial Court found that the juvenile 
court had concluded that, if competent, the infant would choose to be 
discharged to the care of a foster family and have the "no code" order 
remain in effect. 72 The Custody of a Minor Court found that the juvenile 
court's findings were supported by the evidence. 73 Accordingly, the Court 
found no error in the juvenile court's decision based on these findings. 74 
The Court next addressed the DSS' argument that the NEMC should 
have been required to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the infant 
"would not have wished such treatment or that withholding of medical 
treatment is in the child's best interest. "75 The DSS argued that the 
underlying issue centered on the infant's right to live. 76 The DSS asserted 
that the presumption in favor of life requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt before life-prolonging treatment may be withheld. 77 The Court 
rejected this argument stating that the issue presented in the case before it 
was not one of the right to life, but rather, the' 'manner of dying. "78 The 
Court stated that the relevant question was "what measures are appropri-
ate to ease the imminent passing of an irreversibly terminally ill patient in 
light of the patient's history and condition. "79 According to the Court, the 
issue of whether the withholding of medical treatment was appropriate 
was not before it, because the juvenile court's order only concerned the 
foregoing of heroic efforts at resuscitation, and did not limit any treatment 
for the infant's underlying heart condition. 80 
The Court also refused to adopt the proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard advocated by the DSS on the grounds that it would be unrealistic 
to require physicians to testify to a degree of moral certainty that the 
70 [d. at 713, 434 N.E.2d at 610. 
71 [d. at 713-14, 434 N.E.2d at 610. 
72 [d. at 714, 434 N.E.2d at 610. 
73 [d. 
74 [d. 
7S [d. at 711, 434 N.E.2d at 609. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. 
78 [d. 
79 [d. (quoting In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 475, 380 N .E.2d 134, 139 (1978». 
80 [d. at 712, 434 N .E.2d at 609. 
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patient's position was hopeless. 81 According to the Court, to adopt the 
highest burden of proof would, in effect, negate the incompetent's right to 
forego medical treatment. 82 The Court concluded, therefore, that it was 
sufficient that the juvenile court entered detailed findings supported by the 
evidence, "indicating those persuasive factors that determined the out-
come."83 
The significance of Custody of a Minor lies in the fact that it clarifies the 
procedures by which decisions to forego life-prolonging medical treat-
ment are to be made. The Court established that juvenile courts have 
authority to enter orders to withhold treatment for minors within their 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Massachusetts Care and Protection statute. 84 
This holding is in accord with the statutory grant of authority to the 
juvenile courts under General Laws chapter 119, section 24. Although the 
Care and Protection statute does not expressly authorize the juvenile court 
to direct that medical care be withheld from minors under their jurisdic-
tion,85 the broad language of the statute, directing the juvenile court to 
"make any other appropriate order with reference to the care and custody 
of the child as may conduce to his best interest,"86 can best be read as 
encompassing the authority to enter such orders. Furthermore, section 24 
of chapter 119 places primary judicial responsibility for the care of minors 
in the juvenile courtS. 87 These courts have undoubtedly developed par-
ticular expertise in dealing with those issues pertaining to the proper care 
of minors. To require a petition for the authorization to terminate medical 
treatment for a child already under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to 
be brought in probate court would not result in any increased protection of 
the best interests of the minor, but instead could lead to delay, duplication 
of efforts, and even potentially conflicting judicial orders. 88 
The Court's holding that the NEMC had standing to petition the 
juvenile court to enter a "no code" order as a party to the original care 
and protection proceeding is similarly supported by the broad language of 
General Laws, chapter 119, section 24,89 as well as that statute's policy of 
allowing all those parties who may be aware of the need for a particular 
81 Id. at 7l2, 434 N.E.2d at 610. 
82 Id. (citing In the Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 572, 432 N.E.2d 712, 724 (1982)). 
83 Id. at 713, 434 N.E.2d at 610. 
84 Id. at 704-05, 434 N.E.2d at 605-06. 
8S See G.L. c. 119, § 26. 
86 Id. 
87 G.L. c. 119, § 24. 
88 This latter result could obtain where, for example, the juvenile court entered an order 
pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 26, directing that certain medical treatment be administered to a 
minor, and a party simultaneously obtained an order to withhold that medical treatment from 
the probate court. 
89 For the text of G.L. c. 119, § 24, see supra note 53. 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/11
§ 8.2 DOMESTIC RELATIONS 307 
order to bring such need to the attention of the court. 90 This holding, to the 
extent that it is based on the fact that the NEMC was an on-going party to 
the original care and protection petition,91 however, leaves open the 
question as to whether a third party who has not participated in the 
origmal care and protection proceedings could similarly have standing to 
petition for such an order. The rationale of the Court for finding that the 
NEMC had standing to seek the "no code" order, that of allowing third 
parties with information regarding the proper care of a minor within the 
court's jurisdiction to present this information to the court,92 would also 
suggest that the NEMC would have such standing even if it were not party 
to the original care and protection petition. 
The significance of Custody of a Minor also lies in the Court's reaffirma-
tion of its commitment to the judiciary as the appropriate forum, in many 
instances, for determining when life-prolonging medical treatment should 
be withheld.93 This emphasis on the need for judicial decision-making is 
particularly evident in the Court's holding that the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court was not defeated by the subsequent agreement among the 
parties concerning the revocation of the "no code" order.94 This holding 
is consistent with the holding in Spring that once a matter is properly 
presented to the court, the court must decide the issue and cannot dele-
gate decision-making authority to some third party. 95 This emphasis on 
the role of the judiciary and "detached but passionate investigation and 
decision, "96 is, as the Court has noted,97 particularly necessary when 
matters of life and death are being determined. 
Custody of a Minor also helped clarify the application of the Spring 
factors to determinations of when the decision of whether or not to 
withhold medical treatment should rest in the hands of the judiciary. 
Although the child in Custody of a Minor was suffering from a terminal 
disease and the treatment in question would not effectuate a temporary or 
permanent cure, factors which under Dinnerstein and Spring would weigh 
towards private decision-making,98 the Court considered it significant that 
there was no loving family to participate in the decision-making process 
90 See 385 Mass. at 706-07, 434 N.E.2d at 606-07. 
91 See id. at 707, 434 N.E.2d at 607. 
92 [d. at 706, 434 N.E.2d at 606-07. 
93 See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text. 
94 385 Mass. at 709, 434 N.E.2d at 608. 
9S In the Matter of Spring, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1210, 1219, 405 N.E.2d 117, 142. 
96 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370 
N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977). 
97 [d. 
98 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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and concluded that a judicial determination was necessary. 99 Thus, al-
though the Court suggested in Spring that in determining whether a court 
order should be obtained, the totality of the patient's circumstances 
should be considered,loo Custody of a Minor seems to establish that no 
private decision-making can occur in the absence of family members able 
to take part in the process. It should be noted, however, that the presence 
of family members will not always justify private decision-making. As the 
Court has noted previously, 101 family members are not always capable of 
making a substituted judgment, as that process requires the decision 
maker to ignore his own interests and concerns and focus solely on those 
of the patient. 102 Thus, while absence of a loving family requires judicial 
decision-making, the presence of family members should only be consid-
ered as one factor under the Spring test in determining whether a judicial 
decision is necessary. 
Finally, Custody of a Minor is noteworthy for the Court's rejection of 
the proof beyond a 'reasonable doubt standard as the burden of proof 
necessary for sustaining a substituted judgment finding. 103 By refusing to 
adopt this burden of proof, the Court continued the commitment it estab-
lished in Saikewicz to the right of an incompetent to exercise his right to 
refuse treatment and thereby avoid unwanted bodily intrusion and need-
less pain and suffering on the same basis as a competent individual. 104 In 
rejecting proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the applicable standard, the 
Court did not clarify whether it was adopting a preponderance of the 
evidence standard or that of clear and convincing evidence. Rather, the 
Court simply noted that it was sufficient that the lower court has entered 
"detailed finding supported by the evidence, 'indicating those persuasive 
factors that determine[d] the outcome.' "105 This language strongly sug-
gests that the Court has adopted a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard as the appropriate burden of proof for entering a substituted judgment 
decision. This level of proof is appropriate where, as in the instant case, 
extraordinary medical treatment can not save an individual, but instead, 
can only prolong the act of dying. To hold otherwise would, in effect, 
place a burden on incompetent persons not placed on competent persons 
who are capable of withholding consent to intrusive and painful treat-
ment. 
99 Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. at 710, 434 N.E.2d at 608. 
100 In the Matter of Spring, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh.1210, 1216-17,405N.E.2d 117,120-21. 
101 See Guardianship of Roe, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 981, 1009-10,421 N.E.2d 40, 56. 
102 id. 
103 385 Mass. at 712, 434 N.E.2d at 610. 
104 See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,745, 
370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977). 
lOS 385 Mass. at 713, 434 N .E.2d at 610. 
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The Saikewicz Court's recognition of the constitutional right to forego 
medical treatment in certain circumstances will undoubtedly continue to 
raise a host of both procedural and substantive issues. One such issue left 
unresolved by Custody of a Minor is raised by the Court's holding that 
juvenile courts have authority to order the termination of treatment for 
minors within their jurisdiction. The statute on which this jurisdiction is 
based, General Laws chapter 119, section 26, directs the juvenile court to 
enter orders that are in the "best interests" of the minor. 106 The Supreme 
Judicial Court, on the other hand, has directed that decisions regarding 
the termination of treatment be made by applying the "substituted judg-
ment" test. 107 Thus, juvenile courts may be faced with the difficult task of 
applying two potentially conflicting standards of decision-making. Al-
though the Court has previously noted that as a practical matter, both 
standards will yield the same result when the patient is an infant,IOS 
different outcomes may be obtained when the minor is an older child who 
has expressed an opinion regarding his or her treatment. 109 This potential 
dilemma is left unanswered by Custody of a Minor. 
§ 8.3. Insurance Proceeds - Recovery by Designated Beneficiaries Under 
a Breached Divorce Decree. * Seldom in recent years have Massachusetts 
courts had occasion to address the rights of insurance beneficiaries desig-
nated under separation agreements and divorce decrees.! During the 
106 G.L. c. 119, § 26 (1982). 
107 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 751-52, 370 
N.E.2d 417,431 (1977); In re Spring, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1210,1214,405 N.E.2d 117, 119. 
108 Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 753, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (1978). The Court 
noted that the substituted judgment test is subjective in nature whereas the best interest 
standard is objective. Id. When either standard is being applied to make decisions on behalf 
of a child of tender years, however, both tests require "a court to focus on the various 
factors unique to the situation of the individual for whom it must act" and thus the criteria 
and reasoning under both are essentially the same where an infant is involved. /d. 
109 As the Court has noted, the goal of the substituted judgment test is to ascertain to the 
greatest extent practicable the actual needs and desires of the individual involved, even if 
that decision does not correspond to what most people would consider wise or prudent. 
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750-51, 370 
N .E.2d 417, 430 (1977). Thus, it is possible that in the case of an older child able to express 
his or lier desires regarding treatment the substituted judgment test may lead to results at 
odds with those reached under the best interests test. 
* Richard J. McCready, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 8.3. I The most recent officially reported decision prior to Green v. Green, 13 Mass. 
App. Ct. 340,433 N.E.2d 92 (1982), in which this issue arose was Handrahan v. Moore, 332 
Mass. 300, 124 N.E.2d 808 (1955). Cf, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Marcoulier, 322 F. 
Supp. 246 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (applying Massachusetts law in adjudicating a dispute between 
the ex-wife of the decedent and his second wife over the insurance proceeds from policies 
under which the decedent's children from his first marriage had been made beneficiaries 
pursuant to a divorce settlement). 
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Survey year, however, the Appeals Court examined this precise issue in 
Green v. Green. 2 Specifically, the court in Green considered the rights of 
children who were named beneficiaries under insurance policies which 
their father was required to maintain for their benefit pursuant to a divorce 
judgment. 3 The court recognized that these children had two equally 
viable causes of action in the event that their status as beneficiaries should 
be altered in derogation of the divorce decree.4 Essentially, the Green 
decision provides that upon the death of the insured the beneficiaries 
under the divorce decree may either proceed against the estate of the 
breaching decedent or, in the alternative, seek recovery of the insurance 
proceeds in the hands of a later named beneficiary. 5 
Prior to Green, the Supreme Judicial Court examined the problem of 
using the future insurance proceeds as a component of a divorce settle-
ment in Handrahan v. Moore. 6 The Handrahan Court held that where a 
husband agrees in a divorce settlement to maintain certain insurance 
policies for the benefit of his ex-wife, she acquires an equitable interest in 
the proceeds from the policies.? In Handrahan, the wife's equitable 
2 13 Mass. App. Ct. 340,433 N.E.2d 92 (1982). 
3 Id. at 340-41, 433 N.E.2d at 92-93. 
4 Id. at 343, 433 N.E.2d at 94. 
sId. 
6 332 Mass. 300, 124 N.E.2d 808 (1955). 
7 Id. at 303, 124 N.E.2d at 809-10. In Handrahan, the decedent, his first wife, and his 
daughter from his first marriage had entered into a trust agreement in contemplation of the 
decedent's divorce from his first wife. Id. at 300-01, 124 N.E.2d at 808. The agreement 
required the decedent to surrender to his daughter, the designated trustee, two insurance 
policies on his life in the amount of $10,000. Id. at 301, 124 N.E.2d at 808. The decedent's 
first wife was to be designated as beneficiary under the policies and the decedent was 
required to continue during his lifetime to pay the premiums on the policies. Id. The 
decedent was insured under a group insurance plan through his employment, thus, he did not 
surrender policies to his daughter, the trustee, but instead had the insurance company he 
worked for issue a certificate of compliance. Id. at 301, 124 N.E.2d at 809. Due to this 
arrangement, the decedent was able to substitute his second wife as beneficiary under the 
policies without notice to either his first wife or his daughter. Id. at 302, 124 N.E.2d at 809. 
Upon the decedent's death the trustees ofthe group insurance plan paid the proceeds from 
the policies into court. Id. at 302-03, 125 N.E.2d at 809. The decedent's daughter, as trustee, 
brought suit claiming the proceeds, which were claimed by the decedent's second wife as 
well.Id. at 200-01, 124 N.E.2d at 808. The Supreme Judicial Court considered the trust 
agreement executed by the decedent to be in the nature of a property settlement, based on 
valid consideration. Id. at 303, 124 N.E.2d at 809. The Court further found that the 
agreement operated as a binding waiver of the decedent's right to change the beneficiary 
under the two policies. Id. at 303, 124 N .E.2d at 810. The Court concluded that the daughter, 
acting as trustee for the decedent's first wife, acquired an equitable interest in the proceeds 
from the policies by virtue of the agreement. Id. This equitable interest was considered 
superior to the second wife's interest and consequently the proceeds were turned over to the 
trustee.ld. at 303-04, 124 N.E.2d at 810. 
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interest was deemed superior to that of the deceased husband's second 
wife, who had been substituted as the beneficiary under the policies. 8 
Unlike the plaintiff in Handrahan, the plaintiffs in Green were children 
of the decedent and his first wife.9 The children were designated as 
third-party beneficiaries under a stipulation entered into by their parents 
regarding insurance policies on the husband's life. 10 The stipulation -
that the decedent would maintain in effect certain insurance policies on 
his life under which the children of the first marriage would remain 
beneficiaries - was merged into the divorce judgment granted in the year 
prior to the decedent's death. l1 Shortly after his divorce from his first 
wife, the decedent remarriedP Without seeking modification of the di-
vorce judgment,13 the decedent substitued his second wife as the bene-
ficiary under five of the seven insurance policies referred to in the divorce 
judgment.14 Upon the death of the decedent, his second wife received the 
proceeds of the five policies totaling $42,352.50. 15 The children from his 
first marriage received the proceeds of the remaining two policies totaling 
$2,525.74. 16 In addition to the insurance policies, the decedent's will 
provided that his estate be evenly divided and distributed between his 
second wife and a trustee for the children from his first marriage. 17 At the 
time of his death, the decedent's estate was comprised of one savings 
account which had a balance of $35,854.24.18 
The decedent's children brought suit against the decedent's second wife 
to recover the insurance proceeds paid to her. 19 Alternatively, if she were 
unable to pay the full amount ofthe proceeds, the plaintiff children sought 
recovery from the estate of the decedent. 20 The trial judge ruled that the 
decedent's estate was primarily liable to pay the plaintiffs the $42,352.50 
in insurance proceeds of which they were wrongly divested. 21 In addition, 
the trial judge held that the decedent's second wife was secondarily liable 
for the proceeds paid to her. 22 Recovery against the second wife therefore 
8 /d. at 303, 124 N.E.2d at 810. 
9 I3 Mass. App. Ct. at 340, 433 N.E.2d at 92. 
10/d. 
II Id. 
12Id. 
t3 Id. at 340-41, 433 N.E.2d at 92-93. 
14Id. 
IS Id. at 341, 433 N.E.2d at 93. 
16 /d. at 341 n.2, 433 N.E.2d at 93 n.2. 
17 Id. 341,433 N.E.2d at 93. 
18Id. 
19Id. 
20/d. 
21 Id. 
22 /d. 
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could be had only to the extent of any deficiency after payment from the 
estate. 23 
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's ruling.24 On appeal, the judg-
ment was revised to require the decedent's second wife to pay the plain-
tiffs an amount equal to the insurance proceeds paid to her. 2s Under the 
revised judgment, the decedent's estate was held to be secondarily, rather 
than primarily, liable for the insurance proceeds.26 The Appeals Court 
found that the plaintiffs had a "vested equitable interest" in the insurance 
proceeds27 which entitled them to elect to pursue a claim against the 
decedent's estate, or against the second wife wrongfully in possession of 
the insurance proceeds, or against both. 28 
In determining the nature of the plaintiffs' interest in the proceeds, the 
Appeals Court in Green relied upon two cases decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 29 In both Massachusetts Linotyping Corp. v. Fielding, 30 
and the later case of Handrahan v. Moore,31 the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated that an insured's agreement to maintain insurance policies with 
designated beneficiaries, if based on valuable consideration, gives such 
beneficiaries an "equitable interest" in the proceeds of the policies.32 In 
Fielding, the Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that although the insured 
may have the right to change beneficiaries in his contract with the insur-
ance company, he nevertheless may contract with another not to exercise 
this right. 33 The contract, as between the insured and the beneficiaries, 
23 [d. Presumably the trial court was persuaded by the argument which the defendant, the 
decedent's second wife, emphasized on appeal. See id. She contended that the stipulation 
entered into at the time ofthe decedent's divorce from his first wife, represented a contrac-
tual obligation breached by decedent. [d. Since the plaintiffs had an action for legal relief 
against the decedent's estate, based on his breach of contract, the defendant claimed that the 
plaintiffs were required to pursue this avenue of recovery before pursuing their equitable 
claim against her. [d. The defendant's argument thus was premised on the general principle 
that equitable relief is barred to the extent that a plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. [d. 
See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
24 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 341, 433 N.E.2d at 93. 
25 [d. at 344, 433 N.E.2d at 94. 
26 [d. 
27 [d. at 343, 433 N.E.2d at 94 (citing Handrahan v. Moore, 332 Mass. 300, 303, 124 
N.E.2d 808, 810 (1955); Massachusetts Linotyping Corp. v. Fielding, 312 Mass. 147, 149,43 
N.E.2d 521, 522 (1942». 
28 [d. at 343, 433 N.E.2d at 94. 
29 See Handrahan v. Moore, 332 Mass. 300, 124 N.E.2d 808 (1955); Massachusetts 
Linotyping Corp. v. Fielding, 312 Mass. 147,43 N.E.2d 521 (1942). 
30 312 Mass. 147, 43 N.E.2d 521 (1942). 
31 332 Mass. 300, 124 N.E.2d 808 (1955). 
32 Handrahan v. Moore, 332 Mass. 300, 303, 124 N.E.2d 808, 809-10 (1955); Massachu-
setts Linotyping Corp. v. Fielding, 312 Mass. 147, 149, 43 N.E.2d 521, 522 (1942). 
33 312 Mass. 147,149,43 N.E.2d 521,523 (1942). In Fielding, the decedent was alleged to 
have entered into an agreement with a corporation, in which he and his three children were 
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under the contract, operates as a binding waiver of his right to change the 
beneficiaries under the policies designated. 34 The Green court applied this 
reasoning and concluded that the stipulation that had been merged into 
the divorce judgment deprived the decedent of any right to change the 
beneficiaries under the seven designated insurance policies. 35 Conse-
quently, the plaintiffs named as beneficiaries under the divorce judgment 
acquired an equitable interest in the proceeds from the policies. 36 
Having determined the nature ofthe plaintiffs' interest in the proceeds, 
the Green court proceeded to analyze the extent of their rights to recover 
the proceeds as possessors of an "equitable interest" therein. 37 The 
Appeals Court first addressed the contention of the decedent's second 
wife that the plaintiffs had a legal claim for breach of contract against the 
decedent's estate which they were required to pursue prior to any equita-
ble claim they had against her. 38 The court rejected this argument, noting 
that the defendant had cited no case in this context which "even inferen-
tially" supported the priority of claims rule that she relied upon. 39 Citing 
the primary shareholders. /d. at 148,43 N.E.2d at 522. The agreement purportedly provided 
that the decedent would make the corporation the beneficiary under an insurance policy on 
the decedent's life in exchange for the corporation's paying the premiums on the policy.ld. 
Several years after the alleged agreement had been entered into, the decedent's first wife 
died and he subsequently remarried. Id. Two years later, the decedent substituted his 
second wife as beneficiary under the insurance policy and resumed paying the policy 
premiums himself. Id. at 148-49,43 N.E.2d at 522. Upon the death of the decedent, the 
policy proceeds were paid to his second wife. Id. at 148,43 N.E.2d at 522. The decedent's 
children brought suit on behalf of the corporation seeking to impose an equitable lien against 
the policy proceeds.ld. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded the case, id. at 
154,43 N.E.2d at 525, citing the trial court's failure to make a finding on the "main issue" in 
the case, whether in fact the alleged contract had been made.ld. at 149-50,43 N .E.2d at 523. 
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that if the alleged agreement had been made and the 
plaintiff had paid the premiums, "it would acquire an equitable right to the proceeds ofthe 
policy which it could enforce against a person subsequently named as beneficiary, unless the 
latter was a purchaser for value without notice or in some manner acquired an equity 
superior to that of the plaintiff." Id. at 149, 43 N.E.2d at 522. 
34 Id. at 149, 43 N.E.2d at 523. Accord Handrahan v. Moore, 332 Mass. 300, 303, 124 
N.E.2d 808, 810 (1955). 
35 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 342, 433 N.E.2d at 94. 
36 Id. at 434, 433 N.E.2d at 94. 
37 /d. 
38 Id. at 341, 433 N.E.2d at 93. See supra note 23. 
39 Id. at 342, 43 N.E.2d at 93. The defendant relied on three cases decided in other 
jurisdictions to support her priority-rule argument. See, e.g., Lock v. Lock, 8 Ariz. App. 
138,444 P.2d 163 (1968) (court finding that, although divorce decree mandated that insured 
maintain children from his first marriage as beneficiaries on a policy, children had no vested 
equitable interest since no specific policy was designated in decree; thus, no indication that 
the insured intended policies outstanding at his death to be covered by agreement merged into 
the decree); Greenberg v. Greenberg, 264 Cal. App. 2d 896, 71 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1968) (court 
holding that first wife's rights to proceeds were cut off, even though she had vested equitable 
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the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Kruger v. John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. CO.,40 the Green court analogized the plaintiffs' equitable inter-
est as beneficiaries under the insurance policies to that of beneficiaries of 
a truSt.41 The Appeals Court considered the decedent, in effect, to have 
been a trustee standing in a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiffs.42 The 
court referred to several Supreme Judicial Court cases establishing the 
rights of trust beneficiaries triggered by a trustee's breach of his fiduciary 
duty in disposing of the trust cOrpUS.43 From these cases, the Green court 
concluded that "the person having the equitable interest in the property 
may pursue either the property, or the fiduciary who improperly disposed 
interest, since second wife paid the premiums on the policy without notice of the first wife's 
interest therein); Gray v. Bush, 430 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (court denied relief to 
first wife seeking to enforce property settlement agreement calling for ex-husband to main-
tain insurance for the benefit of the couple's children and to make child support payments, 
since ex-husband had set up an irrevocable trust to discharge his obligations under the 
agreement). 
40 398 Mass. 124, 10 N.E.2d 97 (1937). 
41 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 343, 433 N .E.2d at 94. Accord Kruger v. John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 124, 129, 10 N.E.2d 97, 100 (1937). 
42 See Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 241-42, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363, 380 N.E.2d 
189, 193-94 (1978), cited with approval in 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 343, 433 N.E.2d at 94. In 
Simonds the decedent's first wife brought suit against the decedent's second wife and the 
daughter of his second marriage, seeking to impose a constructive trust on proceeds from 
insurance policies on the life ofthe decedent. 45 N.Y.2d at 236-37, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 360,380 
N.E.2d at 191. A separation agreement entered into between the decedent and his first wife 
required the decedent to maintain in effect existing insurance policies with the first wife as 
beneficiary. [d. at 237, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 360, 380 N.E.2d at 191. The decedent allowed the 
policies to lapse and took out new policies naming his second wife and daughter as ben-
eficiaries. [d. at 238, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 361, 380 N.E.2d at 191-92. The New York Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for the first wife, imposing a constructive trust on 
the proceeds ofthe policies. [d. at 236-37, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 360, 380 N.E.2d at 191. The court 
of appeals cited four factors as forming a basis for its imposition of a constructive trust: 1) a 
promise; 2) a transfer in reliance on the promise; 3) the fiduciary relationship between the 
decedent and his first wife; and 4) the unjust enrichment ofthe second wife. [d. at 242, 408 
N.Y.S.2d at 363-64, 380 N.E.2d at 194. With respect to its finding a fiduciary relationship to 
exist between the decedent and his first wife, the court stated, "Because decedent and 
plaintiff were husband and wife, there is a duty of fairness in financial matters extending 
even past the contemplated separation ofthe spouses." [d. at 242, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 364,380 
N.E.2d at 194. 
43 See, e.g., Tierny v. Coolidge, 308 Mass. 255, 259, 32 N.E.2d 198,200 (1941) (Court 
holding that one who receives trust property, with notice that its delivery constitutes a 
breach of trust, holds property as constructive trustee for the trust beneficiary, who may 
recover the property or its value from the constructive trustee); Hervey v. Rawson, 164 
Mass. 501, 503-04, 41 N.E. 682,682-83 (1895) (in action brought by formerly insane person 
against guardian for disposition of a bond held for the benefit of the plaintiff, the Court, 
adopting the trust law, ruled that the plaintiff could proceed either against the person to 
whom the bond was transferred, or the guardian wrongfully disposing of the bond). 
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of the property, or both, at the election of the person having the equitable 
interest. "44 
Although the Green court held that beneficiaries may seek recovery of 
the proceeds wrongfully transferred to another, the court indicated that 
the right to proceed against a later named beneficiary may be a qualified 
one. Drawing support from the Supreme Judicial Court's earlier decisions 
in Fielding and Handrahan, the Green court indicated that it was sig-
nificant that the later named beneficiary in the present case - the dece-
dent's second wife - had received the proceeds "gratuitously or with 
knowledge of the plaintiffs' equitable interest. "45 The Supreme Judicial 
Court in Fielding had expressly stated that the right of designated bene-
ficiaries to enforce their equitable interest against a later named bene-
ficiary would be contingent upon whether the later beneficiary was a 
purchaser for value without notice" or in some manner acquired an equity 
superior to that of the plaintiff. "46 The Green court's emphasis on the 
second wife being a gratuitous beneficiary, possibly with knowledge of the 
children's interest, indicates that the qualifications stated in Fielding 
continue to be viable. 
The Appeals Court's decision in Green is significant for several rea-
sons. First, it is the only officially reported decision by a Massachusetts 
court in almost two decades to confront the issue of beneficiaries' rights to 
insurance proceeds fixed by consideration based agreements made by the 
insured. 47 Second, unlike prior Massachusetts decisions addressing this 
issue, the beneficiaries seeking to recover the insurance proceeds in 
Green were not parties who themselves had contracted with the insured; 
they had tendered no consideration in exchange for their right to remain 
as beneficiaries.48 Without referring to this distinction, the Green court 
took the position that beneficiaries need not be contracting parties to 
44 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 343, 433 N.E.2d at 94. 
4S /d. at 343, 433 N.E.2d at 94. 
46 312 Mass. 147, 149, 43 N.E.2d 521, 522 (1942). 
47 Cj. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Marcoulier, 322 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Mo. 1971) 
(applying Massachusetts law in holding that children from decedent's first marriage had an 
equitable interest in proceeds from insurance policies covered in divorce decree and thus, as 
against second wife of decedent -later named beneficiary - they had a superior right to the 
proceeds). In recent years, courts in other jurisdictions have permitted beneficiaries of life 
insurance policies, removed in violation of divorce judgments and separation agreements, to 
recover the proceeds from substituted beneficiaries, see, e.g., Hirsh v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
134 N.J. Super. 466, 341 A.2d 691 (1975); Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 208 
N.Y.S.2d 189 (1973); McKissick v. McKissick, 93 Nev. 139,560 P.2d 1366 (1977); Richards 
v Richards, 58 Misc.2d 290,206 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1973), or, where the proceeds had not yet 
been distributed, from the insurers. See, e.g., Brunner Meyer v. Massachusetts Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 66 Ill.App.3d 315, 384 N.E.2d 466 (1978); Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 71 
IlI.App.3d 900, 390 N.E.2d 506 (1979). 
48 See 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 340, 433 N.E.2d at 92. 
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enforce their "equitable interest" acquired under an insured's agreement 
with another. 
A third aspect of the Green decision which distinguishes it from the 
prior Supreme Judicial Court decisions in Fielding49 and Handrahan, 50 is 
the Appeals Court's emphasis on trust law in reaching its decision. The 
Green court views the substitution of beneficiaries not so much as a 
breach of the separation agreement, but instead as a breach of the dece-
dent's fiduciary obligations in his role as a quasi-trustee. 51 By adopting 
the trust analogy the Green court eliminates the ambiguous "breach of 
contract - equitable interest" claim which the Supreme Judicial Court 
posited in Fielding 52 and Handrahan. S3 The Green decision clarifies not 
only the avenues of recovery available to beneficiaries with an "equitable 
interest," but, in addition, clarifies that insurance beneficiaries, like trust 
beneficiaries, have a legally cognizable option to elect which avenue(s) of 
recovery they wish to pursue. S4 In order to have the benefits of this 
election, however, a plaintiff beneficiary may have to be prepared to 
prove that the later beneficiary did not acquire its rights by giving value 
without notice of the prior equitable interest. S5 
49 312 Mass. 147,43 N.E.2d 521 (1942). 
50 332 Mass. 300, 124 N.E.2d 808 (1955). 
51 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 343, 433 N.E.2d at 94. 
52 312 Mass. at 149, 43 N.E.2d at 522. 
53 332 Mass. at 303, 124 N.E.2d at 810. 
54 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
55 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
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